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In general equilibrium models in which prices are perfectly flexible and output fluctuations
occur solely because of supply shocks, the source of a foreign exchange risk premium is the
correlation between supply shocks to output and shocks to the money supply (see Stulz (1984) and
Engel (1992).)  Monetary volatility or exchange rate volatility per se will not necessarily result in a
risk premium.  Monetary shocks that have no impact on consumption will not increase the riskiness
of holding domestic or foreign nominal assets.
When nominal prices are sticky, however, monetary shocks will cause changes in output and
consumption.  While in sticky-price models the risk premium still arises from the covariance of
exchange rates with consumption, it is inevitable that such a correlation will exist.  A positive
domestic monetary shock generally leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency and an increase
in home consumption.
The first section of this paper briefly reviews the concept of the foreign exchange risk
premium.  There is a tradition in the literature of defining the risk premium as deviations from
uncovered interest parity.  Empirically, that is a useful approximation for a measure of the risk
premium, but it can lead one astray in theoretical analyses of the determinants of the risk premium.
Some of my previous papers (Engel (1984, 1992, 1996)) have discussed this issue extensively., so
the discussion in section 1 will be short.  Still, it is helpful to review this distinction because
Obstfeld and Rogoff’s  (1998) analysis of the foreign exchange risk premium in their sticky-price
general equilibrium model relies on the traditional (but somewhat misleading) definition of the risk
premium.
Section 2 presents the sticky-price general equilibrium models.  Again, this presentation is
very abbreviated.  That is because the models are drawn directly from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998)
and Devereux and Engel (1998).  The distinction between these two models is that in the Obstfeld-
Rogoff model, producers set prices in their own currency.  The price paid by foreigners for home
goods (and the price paid by domestic residents for foreign goods) varies instantaneously when the
exchange rate changes.  The law of one price holds.  In the Devereux-Engel model, producers set a
price in the home currency for domestic residents and in the foreign currency for foreign residents.
When the exchange rate fluctuates, the law of one price does not hold.  The type of price-setting
behavior of producers matters for the size of the risk premium.
Another thing that matters for the size of the risk premium is the money demand function.
For both models of price setting, the nature of the risk premium depends on whether money demand
is derived from a real-balances-in-the-utility-function framework or a cash-in-advance framework.
Section 3 derives expressions for the foreign exchange risk premium in this matrix of
models: prices set in producers’ currencies versus consumers’ currencies; and money demand
derived from cash in advance versus real balances in the utility function.
Section 4 analyzes the findings.  There are four main points:
1) While the existence of a risk premium in the flexible-price general equilibrium models depends
on the correlation of exogenous monetary shocks and aggregate supply shocks, the risk
premium arises endogenously in sticky-price models.  Monetary variability induces correlation2
between consumption and exchange rates.  This result is appealing in that the foreign exchange
risk premium is directly related to the volatility of exchange rates, which is consistent with the
finding of Flood and Rose (1996)
2) The distribution of aggregate supply shocks has no bearing on the foreign exchange risk
premium in the sticky-price models we analyze.
3) Engel (1984, 1992, 1996) shows the risk premium depends on the prices faced by consumers.
When the law of one price does not hold, as in the model in which producers set prices in
consumers’ currencies, there is no unique foreign exchange risk premium.  The risk premium
for home investors is different from the risk premium for foreign investors.
4) Standard general equilibrium models are incapable of producing risk premiums that are very
large.  One sticky-price model we examine (prices set in consumers’ currencies with a cash-in-
advance constraint) can generate much larger risk premiums.
1. The Foreign Exchange Rate Risk Premium
A useful way analyze the risk premium implicit in the forward exchange rate (defined here
as the home currency cost of buying a unit of foreign exchange one period forward) is to compare
the forward rate to what it would be if investors were risk neutral.  Let  Ft  be the forward rate and
Ft
RN  the risk-neutral forward rate.
If there were only a single consumption good, risk-neutrality implies that utility is linear in



















holds, where Et refers to expectations conditional on time t information; St is the spot exchange rate
(domestic price of foreign currency); and Pt is the nominal domestic-currency price of the
consumption good.  In words, expression (1) means that under risk neutrality there are no expected
real profits from forward market speculation.
Engel (1992) demonstrates that when utility is time separable, and felicity (period by period
utility) is a function of more than one good, equation (1) still defines the risk-neutral forward rate.
It is possible to write an expression such as (1) when felicity is homothetic.  In this case, Pt is the
exact price index associated with the felicity function.  Risk-neutrality means that felicity is linear
in the consumption index, where the consumption index is defined as total nominal consumption
expenditure in the period divided by the price index.



































The risk premium is the defined by comparing  Ft  to  Ft
RN .
Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) show that in models where utility is time-separable with a
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is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.   t C  is a real consumption index in the many-goods
case.
If all variables are distributed log-normally, we can write equation (3) as
f E s Var s Cov s p Cov s a t t t t t t t t t t t = + - + + + + + + + ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 , (4)
where lower-case letters are the natural logs of the corresponding variables in upper cases; and, Vart
and Covt refer to the variance and covariance, respectively, conditional on time t information.
When felicity can be written in the constant-relative-risk-aversion form, so:







equation (4) can be further specialized to:
f E s Var s Cov s p Cov s c t t t t t t t t t t t = + - - + + + + + + ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 r . (5)
Then, using equation (2), we can derive the expression for the risk premium as:
rp f f Cov s c t t t
RN
t t t ” - = - + + r ( , ) 1 1 . (6)4
We can contrast this expression for the risk premium with the usual one in the literature (see
most recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998)),  f E s t t t - + ( ) 1 .  From equation (5), we have
immediately that
f E s Var s Cov s p Cov s c t t t t t t t t t t t - = - - + + + + + + ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 r .
The difference between this expression and the one given in equation (6) is the term
1
2 1 1 1 Var s Cov s p t t t t t ( ) ( , ) + + + - , which is usually called the “Jensen’s inequality” term.  It is
typically argued that the Jensen’s inequality term is small empirically, and so it does not matter
whether it is included as part of the definition of the risk premium.
But Engel (1996) shows that in standard general equilibrium models, the Jensen’s inequality
term generated from the model is just about the same size as the risk premium.  While it is true that
the Jensen’s inequality terms is not large empirically, neither is the risk premium generated from
standard models.  One way of stating how poorly these models do in producing large risk premiums
is that the risk premium the model generates is approximately the same size as the Jensen’s
inequality term, the latter of which is nearly universally recognized to be small.
Moreover, from the standpoint of economic intuition, the risk premium defined in equation
(6) is much more useful than the standard measure.  For example, holding the covariance constant
in equation (6), the risk premium goes to zero as risk aversion disappears (r  goes to zero).  But, in
the usual definition, there is a risk premium even when there is no risk aversion.
All of the models we will examine satisfy the conditions used in deriving expression (6):
variables are distributed log-normally and utility is time-separable with constant time discounting
and constant relative risk aversion.
2. The Sticky-Price Models
The models we consider are derived in detail in Devereux and Engel (1998).  Here only the
salient details of the model will be brought out.
We consider two sticky-price models:
PCP:  In this model, there is producer-currency pricing.  That is, producers set the price in
their own currency.  The price that foreigners pay for domestic goods and the price that home
residents pay for foreign goods fluctuate when the exchange rate changes.  This is the model
examined by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998).
PTM: In this model, there is pricing to market.  That is, producers set the price in the
consumers’ currency.  Prices consumers face do not respond at all to exchange rate changes.
The models are two-country models.  In both models, the representative consumer in the











































- ,      0 > r ,  0 > e ,  0 > ¢ V ,   0 ‡ ¢ ¢ V .















We assume that there are n identical individuals in the home country,  1 0 < < n .  Ch and Cf  are
Dixit-Stiglitz constant-elasticity-of –substitution indexes over consumption of goods produced at
home and in the foreign country, respectively.  (See Devereux and Engel (1998) for their exact
form.)    P
M  are domestic real balances, and L is the labor supply of the representative home agent.




h P P P
- =
1 , (7)
where Ph is a price index over prices of home goods, and Pf is a price index over prices of goods
produced in the foreign country.
There are  n - 1  identical individuals in the foreign country.  Their preferences are similar to
home country residents’ preferences.  The terms in the utility function involving consumption are
identical in the home and foreign countries.  The functional form for real balances and labor are the
same as for the home country residents, but, for foreign residents, they are functions of foreign real
balances and foreign labor supply.
We assume that there are complete asset markets.  Specifically, we assume that residents of
each country can purchase state-contingent nominal bonds. We can write the budget constraint of
the representative home agent as:
t t t t t t
t t t
z t t t T B M L W z B z z q M C P t + + + + = + + -
+ + ￿ + 1
1 1 ) ( ) , ( 1 p .
Here,  ) (
1 + t z B  are contingent home-currency denominated nominal bonds whose prices at time t are
) , (
1 t t z z q
+ , where 
t z  represents the state at time t.   t p  is the representative agent’s share of profits
from home firms.   t T  are monetary transfers from the government.   t W  is the wage rate.






















































where Wt is the wage rate.



















in equilibrium.  Consumption will differ across the two countries only to the extent that there are
changes in the real exchange rate.  In the PCP model, since purchasing power parity holds, we have,
as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) derive, 
*
t t C C = .
Government increases the money supply with direct transfers.  The government budget
constraint (in per capita terms) is simply
t t t T M M + = -1 .
The firms are monopolistic competitors.  The production function for firm i is given by:
) ( ) ( i L i Y = .
Devereux and Engel (1998) derive the price-setting behavior of firms.  Here we note only
that the objective of the domestic firms is to set prices to maximize the expected utility of the
owners, who are the domestic residents.  Firms must set prices before information about the random
domestic and foreign money supplies is known.  No state-contingent pricing is allowed in any of the
three models.  Wages are perfectly flexible ex post, and firms hire as many workers as needed to
produce output demanded at ex post prices.  Wages adjust to insure supply of labor equals demand.
In the PCP model,  Pht and  Pft
* (the foreign-currency price of foreign goods) are
predetermined at time t.  Since the law of one price holds, so  P S P ft t ft =
*  and  P P S ht ht t
* = , the7
prices  Pft  and  Pht
* vary concurrently with the exchange rate.  In the PTM model, all four nominal
prices are predetermined.
We will specialize the term in the utility function to have real balances enter logarithmically















These two assumptions together imply nominal interest rates are constant.  We can derive from


















Intuitively, a monetary expansion leads to a decline in real interest rates (current consumption rises
while next period’s consumption is expected to be unaffected by a monetary shock) but an increase
in expected inflation.  When money follows a random walk and real balances enter utility
logarithmically, movements in real interest rates and expected inflation rates always exactly offset
each other.  Nominal interest rates are constant.







= * . (12)
Now assume that money supplies are distributed logarithmically.  So,





s u . (13)
Here, sm
2  is the variance of the money supply, which is assumed  to be constant over time.
It is useful to collect equations (10), (11) and (12) in log form:
s p p c c t t t t t = - + -
* * r r (14)
r b
c c m p t t t = - + - ln( ) 1 (15)
s m m t t t = -
* (16)
As an alternative to the money demand relationship derived from assuming real balances are
in the utility function, let us consider a cash-in-advance constraint.  We will assume that home
residents must buy all goods with home currency, and foreign residents must buy all goods with
foreign currency.  This gives us:8
m p c t t t - = (17)
m p c t t t
* * * - = (18)
The risk-sharing condition (14) still holds in this model.  Together with equations (17) and (18) we
arrive at this expression for the exchange rate:
s p p m m t t t t t = - - + - ( )( ) ( )
* * 1 r r . (19)
3. Expressions for the Risk Premium
In this section, we derive expressions for the risk premium in our various models.
Discussion of the expressions is postponed until section 4.  We shall consider the model with real
balances in the utility function first, and then proceed to the cash-in-advance model.  In all cases,
we shall use equation (6) for the risk premium.
Real Balances in the Utility Function
In the PTM model, all goods prices are predetermined.  So, using equations (6), (15), and
(16), the risk premium in the PTM model given by:
rp Cov s c

























In the PCP model, the domestic price of foreign goods fluctuates with the exchange rate.
So, we have:
p np n s n p t ht t ft = + - + - ( ) ( )
* 1 1 . (21)
We can then derive the risk premium in the PCP model from equations (6), (15), (16) and (21):9
rp Cov s c
Cov m m m np n s n p
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m m
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It is easy to find the risk premium in the more general utility specification for real balances
in which e „ 1 by examining the solutions for consumption and exchange rates in Devereux and
Engel (1998).  The risk premiums in the more general specifications are simply a multiple of the









where i is the steady-state nominal interest rate.
Cash-in-Advance
In the cash-in-advance model, equations (6), (17) and (19) give us the expression for the risk
premium in the PTM model, recalling that goods prices are predetermined in that model:
rp Cov s c























In the PCP model, we need to derive the solution for the exchange rate:
s p p m m
s m m
m m
t t t t t
t t t
t t
= - - + -
= - + -
= -
( )( ) ( )







r r , (24)
where we have used in the derivation that purchasing power parity holds in the PCP model.
Then we can derive from equation (6), (17) and (24):10
rp Cov s c
Cov m m m np n s n p
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To understand the nature of the risk premium in the sticky-price models, it is helpful to
compare expressions (20), (22), (23) and (25) to the expression for the risk premium in Lucas’s
(1984) two-country asset-pricing model.  In Lucas’s model, prices are perfectly flexible.  There
effectively are complete asset markets.  Output is determined exogenously, and varies over time due
to random supply shocks.  Money demand arises from cash-in-advance constraints.
While Lucas assumes that domestic agents need domestic money to buy home goods and
foreign money to buy foreign goods, we will assume the cash-in-advance constraints given in
equations (17) and (18).  This will make no difference ultimately, because the expression we derive
for the risk premium is exactly that derived by Engel (1992), which assumes the Lucas cash-in-
advance constraint.
Since purchasing power parity holds in this model, and since the complete asset markets
equalize home and foreign consumption, equations (17) and (18) give us
s m m t t t = -
*.
Output at home and abroad,  yt  and  yt
* are exogenously given.  In equilibrium, each agent
consumes exactly the same amount of each good, and all of output is consumed.  So:
rp Cov s c
Cov m m ny n y




t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
= -
= - - + -
= - + - - + -
r
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r r r r
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* *




Endogeneity of Risk Premium in Sticky-Price Models
It is clear from equation (26) that the risk premium in the Lucas model arises out of
correlations between exogenous money supplies and exogenous supply shocks.  If those correlations
were zero, the risk premium would be zero.  Engel (1992) emphasizes this fact, and points out that
much of the literature is misleading on the source of the risk premium in the Lucas model.  Because
that literature incorrectly focuses on  f E s t t t - + ( ) 1  as the measure of the risk premium, it misses the
importance of the covariance between monetary and real shocks.  Engel (1992) cites several papers
which assume the covariance of monetary and real shocks are zero in the Lucas model.  The risk
premium ought to be zero, but those papers add in the Jensen’s inequality terms as part of the risk11
premium.  The Jensen’s inequality terms are non-zero even when real and monetary shocks are
uncorrelated.  Hence, the literature mistakenly derives expressions for the risk premium that are
functions of the variances of monetary and real shocks, because the Jensen’s inequality terms are
functions of the variances.  As equation (26) shows, only the covariances of monetary and real
shocks matter for the risk premium in the Lucas model.
But, all of the expressions for the risk premium in the sticky-price models ((20), (22), (23)
and (25)) involve only the variance of home and foreign money supplies.  The reason is that shocks
to money generate changes in exchange rates and consumption.  So, exchange rates and
consumption can covary even when there are only monetary shocks.  While ultimately the foreign
exchange risk premium depends on there being a correlation between monetary and real variables,
in sticky-price models that correlation arises endogenously.
One appealing feature of the risk premiums generated in the sticky-price models is that the
size of the risk premium is directly related to the volatility of the nominal exchange rate.  In the
Lucas model, by contrast, when exchange rate volatility is reduced, the risk premium is only
reduced if there is a parallel reduction in the covariance of real and monetary shocks.  Flood and
Rose (1996) find that deviations from uncovered interest parity are lower in the EMU, where
exchange rates are less volatile.
Productivity Shocks Do Not Matter for the Risk Premium in Sticky-Price Models
Not only can we generate a foreign exchange risk premium in sticky-price models with
monetary variance alone, but also productivity shocks do not affect the risk premium in the models
we have examined.  We did not introduce productivity shocks into the sticky-price model, but we
can do that by adding a multiplicative aggregate productivity shock for each industry, so that output
is given by:
Y i L i t t t ( ) ( ) =q .
But the output equation plays no role in determining either consumption or the exchange rate in the
models we have examined.  Equations (14), (15) and (16) completely determine the covariance of
the exchange rate with consumption in the real-balances-in-the-utility-function model.  Equations
(14), (17), (18) and (19) determine that covariance in the cash-in-advance model.
If we allowed real balances to enter utility in a form more general than logarithmic (so
e „1), there is a channel through which productivity shocks could affect the risk premium.  The
productivity shocks could affect the nominal interest rate, which in turn could influence
consumption.
Interestingly, that channel is not open in the cash-in-advance formulation of the sticky-price
model.  So, while the stochastic properties of productivity shocks are key to determining the risk
premium in the cash-in-advance Lucas model, they play no role in the cash-in-advance sticky-price
models.12
There is No Unique Risk Premium in PTM Models
As Engel (1984) emphasizes, the measure of the risk premium requires a measure of the
price index of consumption goods.  When individuals consume different baskets, or when they face
different prices, the price indexes will be different.  Then, the risk premium will not be the same for
all individuals.
In the PTM models we have presented, the law of one price does not hold.  So, individuals
in each country face different price indexes.  It is easy to see in our general equilibrium models how
failure of purchasing power parity affects the risk premium.  In the class of models we examine, the
risk premium is given by - rCov s c t t t ( , )for home residents and - rCov s c t t t ( , )
* for foreign
residents.  From equation (10) we find that if purchasing power parity holds, then c c t t =
* and the
two measures of the risk premium are the same.
In the PTM model, where consumption is not equal across countries, the risk premium for
foreign residents is not the same as the expressions given in equations (20) and (23).  Those
equations show that for the home resident, the risk premium is a function only of home country
monetary variance.  The analogous expressions for the foreign resident are functions of foreign
monetary variance.  In the real-balances-in-the-utility-function model, the risk premium is -sm
*
2





Engel suggests testing the null hypothesis of no risk premium and efficient markets by









 has a conditional mean of zero.  But that test depends on the
choice of price index.  As stated, the null is that there is no risk premium for domestic residents.
The analog for no foreign risk premium is to put the foreign price level in the denominator









*  should have a conditional mean of











 having a conditional mean of zero, where F F t t
* ” 1  and
S S t t
* ” 1 .
The Size of the Risk Premium
In the PCP and PTM models in which money demand arises from the assumption that real
balances are in the utility function, the risk premium is independent of the degree of risk aversion.
(See equations (20) and (22).  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) make this point for the PCP model.)
That might initially seem puzzling since rp Cov s c t t t t ” - + + r ( , ) 1 1 .  But the covariance term declines
as r  rises.  This occurs because the variance of consumption is inversely related to r.
1  So, large
                                               
1  The correlation between s and c is independent of r .13
values of r  are associated both with more risk aversion and less risk.  As r goes to zero, the
variance of consumption goes to infinity, so even when individuals are nearly risk neutral the size of
the risk premium does not decline.
These models are incapable of generating large risk premiums.  We can make an argument
similar to those in Engel (1992, 1996), which pertained to the Lucas model. For example, suppose
that a 95% confidence interval for the money growth rate was – 7 percent per year.  This is surely a
generously wide confidence interval.  It implies a standard deviation of money growth of about 4
percent at annualized rates, or 0.04.  The variance of money growth, then, is 0.0016.  So, the PTM
model with money in the utility function can only generate a risk premium of much less than one
percentage point, since it has a value of the risk premium of -sm
2.  In the PCP model, the risk
premium would be even smaller in the symmetric case of equal domestic and foreign monetary
variances.  There the risk premium is (from equation (22)) ( ) 1 2
2 - n m s .
(The risk premium in the more general specification in which e „1 could be larger, since








 times the values taken from equations (20)
and (22).  But, unless e  is extremely large, implying both low income and interest elasticities of
money demand, the risk premium would still be small.)
In the PCP model with the cash-in-advance constraint the risk premium could be larger,
depending on the value of r.  In the symmetric case, the risk premium is r s ( ) 1 2
2 - n m.  Still, with a
plausible value for r of 5, and with n =1, the risk premium is less than one percentage point.
Note, however, that the Lucas model could only generate risk premiums this high if the covariance
of real productivity shocks and money growth shocks were as high as the variance of money supply
shocks.
The interesting case is the PTM model with the cash-in-advance constraint.  In this case, the
risk premium is - r s
2 2
m.  Here with a value of r equal to 5, and a variance of money growth equal
to 0.0016, we get a risk premium of 0.04, or 4 percentage points.  This is very close to the size of
the conditional risk premiums that many studies on U.S. data have found (see Engel (1996) for a
survey of the empirical literature.)
To generate risk premiums even close to this size in neoclassical models, researchers have
had to resort to models where some of the axioms of expected utility are not satisfied.  These
models of “first-order” risk aversion generate risk premiums that are not of the form of r  times a
variance (or covariance), but rather r times a standard deviation.  (See, for example, Bekaert,
Hodrick and Marshall (1997).)
Intuitively, why does the risk premium in this model depend on the square of r ?  The log of
the exchange rate is linearly related to the log of consumption with a factor of r on the log of
consumption.  Hence, the covariance of the log of the exchange rate with the log of consumption
rises with r.  Since the amount of risk aversion increases linearly with r as well, the risk premium
is proportional to the square of r.14
A case can be made that this is a plausible formulation.  First, empirical evidence suggests
that almost all of the short-term volatility in real exchange rates comes from volatility in nominal
exchange rates (see, for example, Engel (1999).)  This is consistent with the PTM model.  If the
risk-sharing condition (14) is true, the covariance of the exchange rate with consumption must be r
times the variance of consumption.  Even if one were not willing to accept the assumption that asset
markets are complete, it is plausible that equation (14) is the right order of magnitude. When
purchasing power parity fails, even complete asset markets do not eliminate country-specific risk.
But, the more risk averse individuals are, the more risk sharing is likely to occur.  So, equation
(14)’s implication that the standard deviation of relative consumption is equal to 1/ r  times the
standard deviation of the exchange rate with consumption is natural.
No matter how money demand is modeled, the PTM set-up along with the risk-sharing
equation (10) gives us that Cov s c Var c Cov c c t t t t t t t t ( , ) ( ) ( , )
* = - r r .  In the models we have
examined, Cov c c t t t ( , )
* = 0 so Cov s c Var c t t t t t ( , ) ( ) = r .  Since we have the risk premium given by
rp Cov s c t t t t ” - + + r ( , ) 1 1 , the risk premium must be rp Var c t t t ” - + r
2
1 ( ).  Thus, sticky-price models
of the PTM variety, with a risk-sharing condition that implies there is more consumption smoothing
as the degree of risk aversion increases, naturally give rise to a risk premium equal to the square of
the risk aversion coefficient times the variance of consumption.
This result is not dependent on the cash-in-advance formulation.  Indeed, this result holds
even in our real-balances-in-the-utility-function model.  But that model has the unfortunate property
that the variance of consumption is 1
2 / r  times the variance of the money supply, so the coefficient
of risk aversion drops completely out of the expression for the risk premium.  But if the link
between consumption variance and the variance of money growth does not depend on r, then the
PTM model will produce much larger risk premiums than models that assume purchasing power
parity (either with sticky prices or without.)
5.  Conclusions
While the PTM model is capable of producing large enough risk premiums to match the
data, there is another empirically puzzling aspect to the foreign exchange risk premium that has not
yet been addressed here.  As Engel (1996) emphasizes, models of the risk premium also need to
generate correlations between the risk premium and the forward premium in order to explain the









 is positively correlated with  F S t t - .  In log
terms, the risk premium as we have defined it, rpt  must be positively correlated with the interest
differential, i i t t -
* to be able to explain that empirical regularity.
The models presented in this paper have assumed a constant variance of the money supply,
which implies constant risk premiums.  To generate this correlation, time-varying variances need to
be introduced.15
Consider the PTM model with the cash-in-advance constraint.  Since the risk premium is
given by - r s
2 2
m, we need a negative correlation between monetary variance and i i t t -
* to get the
desired correlation between the risk premium and the interest differential.  Such a model is beyond
the scope of this paper.  But, if an increase in the money supply lowers nominal interest rates (as it
would in the constant-variance version of this model), then we need that the variance of money
growth rates increases with the level of the money supply.
Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997) show that the nominal interest rate volatility predicted
in flexible-price general equilibrium models is far too great relative to the size and variance of the
risk premium.  It seems that the sticky-price models have some potential of resolving this issue.  We
have seen that when the money supply follows a random walk and real balances enter the utility
function logarithmically, nominal interest rates are constant.  That property holds whether the
second moments of money are constant or not.  In that case we can build a model with a time-
varying risk premium with completely stable nominal interest rates.  However, it was the cash-in-
advance formulation, not the money-in-the-utility model, that held the greatest promise for
generating large risk premiums.  In the cash-in-advance model with random-walk money, nominal
interest rates are no longer constant.
It is an open question whether one could build a PTM model with an empirically plausible
money demand and money supply specification that could explain the uncovered interest parity
puzzle.  But, this appears to be a promising avenue for future research.16
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